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sion is bolstered by the removal of the requirement that "the period
of time when the purchase is made is alone attended to" 1 by Act
709 of 1979.
William L. Hearne
Baten v. Taylor: SURVIVORSHIP CLAUSES SURVIVE THE CIVIL LAW
Gordon D. Baten died testate at his domicile in Beaumont,
Texas, leaving separate immovable property situated in Louisiana to
his wife on the condition that she survive him by thirty days. In the
event that the condition was not fulfilled, the property was to go to
his nephews. The decedent's sister, his presumptive intestate heir,
unsuccessfully attacked the will in district court. The decision was
reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which held that the
disposition conflicted with Civil Code article 1520, prohibiting "sub-
stitutions" as defined by that article, and article 1609, which, in the
absence of forced heirs, gives the universal legatee seizin of the suc-
cession immediately upon the testator's death.1 Despite the
obstacles posed by these two articles, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed, holding: (1) the disposition contained none of the essential
characteristics of a prohibited substitution as defined by article
1520, and (2) a universal legacy subject to a suspensive condition
does not conflict with the seizin provisions of the Civil Code. Baten
v. Taylor, 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979).
A condition which depends upon the occurrence of a futdre or
uncertain event is classified as either suspensive or resolutory.,
That which takes effect only upon the happening of the event is said
to be suspensive,' while that which takes effect immediately but is
defeated by the event is deemed resolutory.4 A testator is free to
impose such conditions upon a testamentary disposition,5 provided
that they are not illegal, immoral, or impossible.' Conditions such as
that in the present case, known generally as survivorship clauses,
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978
La. Acts, No. 627).
1. Succession of Gwathmey, 364 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
2. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2021, 2043, 2045.
3. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2021, 2043.
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2021, 2045.
5. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1519, 1527, 1698, 1699.
6. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1519, 1527, 2031.
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have been widely accepted in common law jurisdictions.' However,
the validity of such clauses under Louisiana law has long been ques-
tioned by some commentators." In part, this doubt resulted from the
fear that such clauses constitute prohibited substitutions as defined
in Civil Code article 1520.'
Substitutions originated in early Rome, where they were of two
types -direct and indirect." The former is exemplified by the vulgar
substitution." So called because of its frequent usage, the vulgar
substitution was simply a means whereby a testator could avoid in-
testacy. A substitute legatee was designated to receive the succes-
sion in the event that the first named legatee refused to accept or
was unable to do so."z In such a case, the substituted legatee received
directly from the testator himself. In an indirect substitution, the
ultimate beneficiary received, not from the testator, but through an
intermediary designated by the testator." Indirect substitutions in-
cluded the pupillary and exemplary substitutions." The pupillary
substitution allowed a father who had a child below the age of
puberty to provide a substitute for the child in the event that he
outlived the testator, yet died before reaching the age of testamen-
7. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 147 at 828-29 (2d ed. 1953); J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JOHNSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE IN-
TEREST, AND ESTATE PLANNING 244 (1972); J. RUBIN & A. RUBIN, LOUISIANA TRUST
HANDBOOK 177 n.16 (1968). In at least one state, such survivorship clauses have been
codified as the rule rather than the exception. The Ohio Code provides: "When the sur-
viving spouse, or other heir at law, legatee or devisee dies within 30 days after the
death of the decedent, the estate of such first decedent shall pass and descend as'
though he had survived such surviving spouse, or other heir at law, devisee or
legatee." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Anderson).
However, a testator may indicate in his will that the above statute shall not apply
to property bequeathed by him. Barrick v. Fligle, 146 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio 1957).
8. Kelleher, The Marital Deduction Under Louisiana Law, 26 TUL. L. REV. 154
(1952); Nathan, Common Disasters and Common Sense in Louisiana, 41 TUL. L. REV.
33 (1966); Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1961); Wisdom &
Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate Planning, 26 TUL. L. REV. 119,
139-40 (1952).
9. Civil Code article 1520 provides:
Substitutions are and remain prohibited, except as permitted by the laws relating
to trusts. Every disposition not in trust by which the donee, heir, or legatee is
charged to preserve for and to return a thing to a third person is null, even with
regard to the donee, the instituted heir, or the legatee.
10. C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 693 (6th ed. Esmein 1954) in C.
LAZARUS, 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 305 (1969).
11. Id.
12. Tucker, Substitutions, Fideicommissa and Trusts in Louisiana Law: A Seman-
tical Reappraisal, 24 LA. L. REV. 439 (1964).
13. C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 10.
14. Id.
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tary capacity. 5 The exemplary substitution allowed an ascendant to
appoint a substitute to a descendant permanently insane or in-
capable of testation from some other defect."
The Roman word "substitution" was applied only in the above
mentioned contexts. 7 The device by which a testator charged his
donee, instituted heir, or legatee to preserve and deliver a bequest
to a third person was known in Roman law as a fideicommissum."8
Known in France as the "substitution fidicommissaire,"" this device
allowed a testator to pass his property in sequence from one suc-
cessor to another an indefinite number of times.2" With the economic
decline of the French nobility, this process became an invaluable ex-
pedient for the preservation of landed wealth. Since the property
was rendered inalienable, the fiduciary was forced to remain rich in
spite of himself, and the family fortune was protected."' The French
Revolution suppressed such a perpetuation of wealth, along with the
feudal and aristocratic system. The new prohibition against this sort
of substitution facilitated the mobility of property and released land
from the limitations which had kept it out of commerce.2' This pro-
hibition was subsequently codified and is now article 896 of the
French Civil Code." Brown and Moreau Lislet undoubtedly borrowed
15. W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 185 (1928).
16. Id. at 186.
17. Tucker, supra note 12, at 444.
18. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 15, at 218. This practice originally arose when a
man wanted to benefit his community or to give something to another without going
through the process of making a new will. In such cases it was common practice to
direct a beneficiary to deliver the property to another. This could be done in the will
itself, a codicil, or by word of mouth, and such donations were not originally en-
forceable. However, they grew in popularity, and as they began to be made in favor of
the public itself, they soon became recognized as legal and enforceable; a public official,
the praetor fideicommissarius, was appointed to deal with them. Id.
19. Tucker, supra note 12, at 445 & 449.
20. Id. at 445.
21. 3 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 3269 at 589-90. The use of
substitutions was so abused that they were eventually regulated. The Ordinance of
Orleans (1560), reestablished by the Ordinance of 1747, limited substitutions to two
degrees, not counting the first disposition. Some would have preferred to abolish them
completely. Id., no. 3271 at 590.
22. Id., no. 3272 at 590. There is evidence that the desire to release the land from
its limitations was also political, promoting great popular support for the revolution.
Id.
23. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 896 (J. Crabb trans. 1977). This article provides:
"Substitutions are prohibited. Any disposition whereby a donee, appointed heir or
legatee would be charged with conserving and giving to a third party is void, even
with regard to the donee, appointed heir or legatee."
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heavily from the text of this French article," which formed the basis
for our present article 1520.
21
All substitutions are not prohibited in Louisiana. The vulgar
substitution of article 1521 has always been permitted.' Only the
substitution defined by article 1520 is disallowed." In view of the
many types of substitutions and their convoluted history, it is not
surprising that the Louisiana courts have groped ineffectively for a
comprehensive definition of exactly what is prohibited by article
1520." Indeed, the jurisprudence in this area has been rife with con-
flicting interpretations and confusion." Frequently, the courts have
had difficulty in distinguishing a prohibited substitution from the
separate grants of naked ownership and usufruct authorized by arti-
24. With two exceptions the language of article 40 of the Louisiana Digest of 1808
is virtually identical to that of French Civil Code article 896. The Louisiana article con-
tained an additional prohibition against fidei commissa. Because of this prohibition,
there was no longer any need for a "trebillianick" portion of the succession. This was
the portion that the instituted heir was entitled to keep when charged with a fiduciary
bequest. LA. DIGEST of 1808, ch. IV, art. 40.
The second change of note was from the conjunctive "and" to the disjunctive "or"
between the words "preserve for" and "to return." This change was almost certainly a
simple oversight on the part of Brown and Moreau Lislet, see Tucker, supra note 12,
at 464, which was finally corrected in 1962. At the same time, the third paragraph of
article 1520 relative to the trebellianic portion was deleted. 1962 La. Acts, No. 45.
25. By Act 45 of 1962, the legislature corrected the error mentioned at note 24,
supra. In addition, the prohibition against fidei commissa was eliminated. Finally, arti-
cle 1520 for the first time alluded to the authorization of certain substitutions by the
Trust Code. See LA. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (Supp. 1964 & 1979). See note 38, infra.
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1521. The vulgar substitution of article 1521 is virtually the
same as that of Roman times; it is a disposition whereby another party is called to
take the gift in case the donee or legatee does not take it. The vulgar substitution
does not have, as does a prohibited substitution, the objectionable characteristic of
removing property from commerce, but is merely a device for preventing a lapsed
legacy. Nabors, Restrictions Upon the Ownership of Property- Trusts, Fidei Com-
missa and Substitutions, 4 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1929).
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1520.
28. As Justice Barham noted in his concurring opinion in Succession of Walters,
261 La. 59, 73, 259 So. 2d 12, 17 (1972), "[tloo much has . . .been written by too many
on article 1520 for clarity to exist."
29. For example, in Succession of Strauss, 38 La. Ann. 55 (1886), a testamentary
disposition in favor of minors was conditioned upon their attaining majority, the shares
of those who did not survive accruing to those who did. The disposition was upheld,
with the court specifically approving double conditional legacies. Yet, in Succession of
McCan, 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220 (1895), a will with an identical provision was held
invalid as containing all the evils of a prohibited substitution. Finally, in Heikamp v.
Solari, 54 So. 2d 347 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952), a disposition made to the testator's
sister and upon her death to the testator's niece and grandnieces was upheld, the
disposition in favor of the nieces being found merely precatory and reputed as not
written.
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cle 1522.0 Once a prohibited substitution was found to exist, there
was often disagreement as to the effect of the substitution upon the
will."
While the jurisprudence fails to demonstrate a consistent treat-
ment of substitutions, legislative enactments in the area have
generally expanded the instances in which a substitution is permissi-
ble. In 1921, the Louisiana Constitutional Convention adopted a pro-
vision which prohibited the legislature from authorizing substitu-
tions or fidei commissa 2 In order to clear the path for a new trust
code, amendments were made to the constitution" and article 1520,1
providing that substitutions in trust were not prohibited. 5 At the
30. See Succession of Williams, 169 La. 696, 125 So. 858 (1930); Succession of
Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 85 So. 908 (1920); Succession of Law, 31 La. Ann. 456 (1879).
The problem of distinguishing a substitution from creation of a usufruct has been
clarified by Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635, 194 So. 572 (1940). See generally,
Nabors, An Analysis of the Substitution- Usufruct Problem Under articles 1520 and
1522 of the Louisiana Civil Code, 4 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1929).
31. One line of cases maintained that in the event of a prohibited substitution, the
entire testament is null. Crichton v. Gredler, 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (1970); Succes-
sion of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So. 2d 114 (1966); Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058,
67 So. 2d 591 (1953). The opposing line holds that a prohibited substitution results in
the total nullity of a particular bequest but does not affect the remaining valid disposi-
tions of the will. Succession of Smart, 214 La. 63, 36 So. 2d 639 (1948); Succession of
Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 85 So. 908 (1920). This controversy was finally resolved in Suc-
cession of Walters, 261 La. 59, 259 So. 2d 12 (1972), in which the latter position was ad-
judged correct.
32. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1921). Presumably, this prohibition against substitu-
tions meant only those defined by article 1520. Otherwise, the substitutions authorized
by article 1521 would also be proscribed.
33. See 1962 La. Acts, No. 521.
34. See 1962 La. Acts, No. 45.
35. The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 had authorized the creation of trust
estates for a specified period. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1921). This provision was
amended several times, usually in order to lengthen the period of time for which trust
estates might be authorized. Tucker, supra note 12, at 472. While the amendments, un-
doubtedly intended to prepare for a new trust code, it is quite likely that they were in-
tended also to alter the interpretation then being given the constitutional provision
and article 1520 by a series of cases in which the creation of substitutions within a
trust estate was not allowed. Succession of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957);
Succession of Meadors, 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
One could envision that after the amendments in 1962, this line of cases would be
judicially overturned. Yet, in Succession of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So. 2d 115 (1965),
the court ignored the new legislation and clung tenaciously to the Guillory-Meadors
position. It was not until Succession of Stewart, 301 So. 2d 872 (La. 1974), that the
court abandoned this rationale and upheld a trust provision containing a substitution.
This case was by far the most liberal interpretation given a trust instrument to that
date and indicated a tendency towards liberal construction for future cases. 1 G.
LEVAN, THE LOUISIANA ESTATE PLANNER 11 (1974).
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same time the prohibition against fidei commissa was deleted." With
enactment of the Trust Code in 19643? substitutions in trust were ex-
pressly made permissible if authorized by that code.38 However, the
basic prohibition in article 1520 has remained intact.
It is little wonder that commentators familiar with this history
advised practitioners against the use of conditional testamentary
donations such as that in the present case. 9 Yet, fear of drafting a
prohibited substitution was not alone in justifying the caution urged
by those commentators. Such conditional donations also were believed
to conflict with the traditional civil law notion of seizin. °
The concept of seizin, like the notion of prohibited substitution,
dates to the Roman era. In Rome, all heirs other than family heirs
36. See, 1962 La. Acts, No. 45. The fidei commissum was frequently equated with
the common law trust to support the notion that such trusts were prohibited in Loui-
siana. Succession of Ward, 110 La. 75, 34 So. 135 (1903); Succession of Beauregard, 49
La. 1176, 22 So. 348 (1897); Partee v. Hill, 12 La. Ann. 767 (1857). Yet, at least one com-
mentator feels that the term "fidei commissum" was in no way intended by the redac-
tors to prohibit the common law trust. "It would seem completely unjustifiable to
imagine that a scholar with the breadth of learning in the Civil Law of Moreau Lislet
would have used a technical term of the Roman civil law, with the precise connotation
of fidei commissum, to prohibit the use of an alien legal concept." Tucker, supra note
12, at 465. Rather, it is probable that the term "fideicommissum" was intended to pro-
hibit the Spanish concept of the fiduciary substitution known as the "fideicommissaria."
Id. at 465-66.
This argument has much to commend it. As Tucker points out, the redactors, had
they intended to prohibit trusts, could easily have said, "substitutions and trusts are
prohibited." If one adopts the Tucker theory, i.e., prohibited substitutions and fidei
commissa meant the same thing, then for years the ordinary common law trust was
prohibited in Louisiana due to erroneous judicial interpretation.
37. LOUISIANA TRUST CODE: LA. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (Supp. 1964 & 1979). See 1964 La.
Acts, No. 338.
38. LA. R.S. 9:1723 & 1736 (Supp. 1964). Section 1723 provides: "A diposition
authorized by this Code may be made in trust although it would contain a prohibited
substitution if it were made free of trust." LA. R.S. 9:1723 (Supp. 1964). In Crichton v.
Gredler, 256 La. 156, 235 So. 2d 411 (1970), the Louisiana Supreme Court took the posi-
tion that this provision was meaningless in light of LA. R.S. 9:1971 (Supp. 1964), which
provides: "The interest of a principal beneficiary is acquired immediately upon the
creation of a trust, subject to the exceptions provided in this Code." The court in
Crichton reasoned that since no substitutions were authorized expressly by the Trust
Code, and since the interest of the principal beneficiary must be acquired immediately
upon creation of the trust, then section 1971 implicitly prohibited the creation of
substitutions in trust. 256 La. at 168-73, 235 So. 2d at 416-17. A forceful dissent by
Chief Justice Sanders expressed misgivings about the court's treatment of the
substitution problem in light of the new Trust Code provisions. 256 La. at 173, 235 So.
2d at 417. In Succession of Walters, 261 La. at 73, 259 So. 2d at 17 (1972) (Barham, J.,
concurring), Justice Barham, who voted with the majority in Crichton, reassessed his
former position concerning prohibited substitutions and advocated that the judiciary
do likewise.
39. See note 10 & 12, supra.
40. See note 10, supra, and accompanying text.
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acquired the inheritance only by a special act of acquisition and by
entry upon the succession. During the interval between the death of
the testator and the entry, the inheritance was deemed vacant.4 To
avoid holding the succession in abeyance, the French adoped the fic-
tion that the patrimony is transmitted to the heir precisely at the
moment of the testator's death. 2 From that moment, the heir is
substituted for the deceased, thereby assuming his rights and obli-
gations.'" However, this concept should be distinguished from seizin,
which is procedural in nature.
The notion of seizin was formulated textually in article 318 of
the Customs of Paris as: "Le mort saisit le vif, son hoir les plus proche,
& habile d luy succeder."" As explained by Pothier:
Le mort . .. he whose succession is at issue, from the instant of
his natural or civil death, which is the last moment of his life;
saisit . . . is deemed to place in possession, of all his rights and
property;
le vif son hoir les plus proche ... he who has survived him and
who, as his closest relation, is called to be his heir.5
Thus, the French system embodies the dual concepts of ownership
and seizin." Seizin denotes possession in a civil sense'7 and further
denotes the person responsible for the property in the administra-
tive sense."8
Before 1825, under the laws then in force in Louisiana, the
Roman tradition was followed-the succession was not transmitted
to the heir until accepted by him.'9 The redactors of the Code of
1825 recommended the suppression of this rule, preferring instead
41. M. KASER, ROMIsCHES PRIVATRECHT § 71 (6th ed. 1968), reprinted in R. DAN.
NENBRING, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 305 (2d ed. 1968).
42. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 711 & 781 (J. Crabb trans. 1977); 9 C. AUBRY & C.
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 709 (6th ed. Esmein 1954) in 4 C. LAZARUS, CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS 97 (1971). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 870 & 1007.
43. C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 21, at § 723 in C. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at
485. This doctrine was also adopted by the Spanish in LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 6, tit. 5,
L. 1 (Lislet & Carleton trans. 1820), and the SPANISH CIVIL CODE in articles 657 and
661.
44. COUTUMES DE LA PREVOSTIk DE PARIS, NOUVEAU COUTURIER, Tome III, art. 318.
45. OEUVRES DE POTHIER, Tome I, Sec. III at 178 (1811) (writer's trans.).
46. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Succes-
sions and Donations, 33 LA. L. REV. 199, 201 (1973).
47. 1 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DES SUCCESSIONS 116
(1905); C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 42, at § 609 in C. LAZARUS, supra note 42, at
101-02.
48. C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 10, at § 723 in C. Lazarus, supra note 10, at
485.
49. LA. DIGEST of 1808, ch. VI, sec. VI, arts. 122 & 124.
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the idea that the rights of the heir be vested from the moment of
the decedent's death." The redactors then formulated the text of
what now constitutes Civil Code articles 940 through 949 and, in so
doing, clearly contemplated a scheme identical to the French con-
cept of seizin, as evidenced by the comment: "The doctrine by which
the heir became seized of full right of the succession left to him, be-
ing foreign to the Roman and Spanish laws, we have taken the
disposition of this chapter from the best authors who have written
on the subject, such as Pothier and others."51
Under the Civil Code scheme, one of three classes of heirs
becomes seized of the succession immediately upon the death of the
deceased.2 In the event that there are no forced heirs, who are the
first group to receive under the plan of the Civil Code, 8 the univer-
sal heir becomes seized of the succession.5 Should both of these
classes be vacant, seizin is imparted to the legitimate heirs of the
deceased.55 Thus, because an irregular heir does not fall within one
of the above mentioned classes, he would acquire ownership of his
hereditary share immediately upon the death of the testator, yet
50. PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825, 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES
115 (1937).
51. Id. at 117. Thus, as the court noted in 1831, a major change was effected in
Louisiana successions law. O'Donald v. Lobdell, 2 La. 229, 302 (1831). The court further
noted that, while creditors have the power to call upon an heir to accept or renounce a
succession, the failure of the heir to do so does not place the succession in abeyance.
"The law has expressly said, that the heir represents the succession, and is seized of it
from the moment it is opened." Id. at 303-04. However, just five years later in Davis's
Heirs v. Elkins, 9 La. 135 (1836), the same court ignored this line of reasoning, clinging
instead to the untenable proposition that until an heir accepts or renounces the succes-
sion, the succession is in suspense. The court's authority for this holding was Civil
Code article 940, now article 946, which provides:
Though the succession be acquired by the heir from the moment of the death of
the deceased, his right is in suspense, until he decides whether he accepts or re-
jects it. If the heir accepts, he is considered as having succeeded to the deceased
from the moment of his death; if he rejects it he is considered as never having
received it.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 946.
In speaking of the acquisition of the succession, this article is referring to the
ownership of the succession as dealt with by the present article 940, which states: "A
succession is acquired by the legal heir, who is called by law to the inheritance, im-
mediately after the death of the deceased person ...." LA. CIv. CODE art. 940. That
this concept is distinct from possession is shown by Civil Code article 941: "The right
mentioned in the preceding article is acquired by the heir by the operation of the law
alone, before he has taken any step to put himself in possession . LA. Cm'. CODE
art. 941.
52. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 914, 1607.
53. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1607.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1609.
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1613.
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would be unable to exercise any of the rights of the deceased for
lack of seizin."
As the foregoing demonstrates, ownership is to be distinguished
from seizin. Civil Code articles dealing with acquisition of ownership
are substantive provisions, transferring ownership of the succession
immediately upon the decedent's death. Seizin, on the other hand, is
a procedural concept dealing with the legal investiture of possession
of the succession property. As stated by the court in Tulane Univer-
sity v. Board of Assessors,57 seizin should not be seen as "excluding,
or affecting in the slightest degree, the ownership vested in the heir
or universal legatee. [Rather] . . . it is a holding for the true owner,
and merely for the purpose of administration."58
Prohibited substitutions and seizin were examined in substantial
detail by the court in Baten. Adopting the Law Institute's inter-
pretation of article 1520 as authoritative, the court determined that
none of the three requisite elements of a prohibited substitution
were present. As described in the Report of the proposed Trust
Code, these elements are:
(1) A double liberality, or a double disposition in full owner-
ship, of the same thing to persons called to receive it, one
after the other;
(2) Charge to preserve and transmit, imposed on the first
beneficiary for the benefit of the second beneficiary;
(3) Establishment of a successive order that causes the
substituted property to leave the inheritance of the burden-
ed beneficiary and to enter into the patrimony of the
substituted beneficiary.5"
The court reasoned that since the widow would not have received
the succession in full ownership if she had failed to survive her hus-
band for thirty days, there was no double disposition in full owner-
ship. The nephews would have received the legacy only if she had
failed to receive it, taking it directly from the testator with their
ownership vesting retroactively to the date of his death."' As to the
charge to preserve, the court found the thirty-day suspensive period
too brief to create such a charge." Thus, the second element was ab-
56. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-72 Term-Succes-
sions and Donations, supra note 46, at 203-04.
57. 115 La. 1025, 40 So. 445 (1905).
58. 115 La. at 1029, 40 So. at 447.
59. Report by the Louisiana State Law Institute to Accompany the Proposed
Trust Code, 1964 La. Acts, No. 338.
60. 386 So. 2d at 337.
61. Id.
[Vol. 41
NOTES
sent. Finally, for the same reasons that there was no double disposi-
tion in full ownership in the first place, the will did not create a suc-
cessive order whereby the property would leave the patrimony of
the widow to enter those of the nephews."2 Thus, the court stated
that the Baten disposition contained none of the essential elements
of a prohibited substitution- all three of which must be present
before a disposition will be invalidated. 3
In its discussion of seizin, the court, perhaps for the first time,
sharply distinguished between seizin and ownership: "Whether an
heir acquires seizin . .. depends not on his ownership of succession
property, but on whether he is a member of the class of heirs entitled to
seizin of a particular succession according to the codal order of
priority."'" Stating that a testator could impose upon his legacy any
conditions not contrary to law or good morals, the court reasoned
that the Civil Code did not prohibit expressly or impliedly a univer-
sal legacy subject to a suspensive condition." Any interpretation to
the contrary would "create an arbitrary restriction on the testator's
authority."6 The court also stated that since the universal legatee
was installed under a suspensive condition, the testator's legitimate
heirs became seized of the succession at the moment of death, re-
maining provisionally seized until the condition was fulfilled. 7 Since
seizin was not suspended by the testator's disposition of his prop-
erty, the court upheld the will.6
The Baten decision should provide clarity in two traditionally
confused areas of Louisiana law, viz., prohibited substitutions and
seizin. The adoption of the Law Institute's recommended criteria for
determining what constitutes a prohibited substitution" should help
resolve judicial conflict on the matter, while at the same time bring-
ing Louisiana law into conformance with that of France, where such
clauses are generally recognized as valid.7" Crucial to finding that
62. Id.
63. Id. at 337-38.
64. Id. at 340.
65. Id. at 339.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 340.
68. Id. at 340-41.
69. See text at note 58, supra.
70. See M. PLANIOL, supra note 21, pt. 2, no. 3295, at 601. The Baten court made
the statement that all of the jurisprudence construing article 1520 must be reassessed
since, by amendment, the legislature has harmonized our definition of substitutions
with French doctrine. 386 So. 2d at 337. One may question whether this indicates a
willingness to allow all the French exceptions to the prohibition against substitutions.
These are: (1) the disposable portion may be given to a child subject to the require-
ment that he transfer the same to his children, and (2) a disposition in favor of a
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the survivorship clause did not meet these criteria was the court's
interpretation of the condition as suspensive. Had the condition
been found resolutory, the ownership of the wife would have become
absolute immediately upon the testator's death. If she had then failed
to live thirty days, that ownership would have terminated in favor
of the nephews. Thus, they would have received the property in-
directly from the testator, and only after it had passed through the
wife's patrimony. It is just such an indirect substitution that is pro-
hibited by article 1520.
The court, in concluding that the condition was suspensive, based
its interpretation in part upon the brevity of the survivorship
period. This approach is unfortunate. The condition is suspensive
because it suspends the right of the donee until the happening of an
uncertain event. The length of time that these rights are suspended
is immaterial in determining whether the condition is suspensive vel
non.
7 1
The determination that the condition was suspensive also greatly
affected the court's treatment of seizin. One could easily argue that
as the universal legatee, the testator's wife should have become
seized of the property immediately upon her husband's death.72 The
court rejected this rationale, holding instead that because the wife
was suspensively installed, there was, in effect, no universal legatee
until the suspensive condition occurred. The testator's legal heirs
became seized for the duration of this period, and a gap in seizin was
avoided. After termination of the suspensive period, the disposition
became fully effective, and the testator's wife acquired full seizin.
The resolution of this problem, although laudable, is of diminished
practical importance, since, as the court noted, article 3211 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure gives the succession represen-
tative full seizin of the deceased's property."
While clarifying two ancient doctrines of the civil law, Baten
also introduces an entirely new concept. For the first time in Loui-
siana, judicial sanction has been accorded to survivorship clauses.7'
A testator may now provide that should a legatee fail to survive the
legator for a stipulated period, the succession is to descend upon an
alternative legatee. For example, a testator owning a piece of family
brother or sister may be subject to the requirement that it be transferred to the
children born in the first degree of said brother or sister. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts.
1048-49 (J. Crabb trans. 1977).
71. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2021, 2043.
72. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 915, 1607.
73. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3211.
74. J. RUBIN & A. RUBIN, supra note 7.
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property may provide that in the event the first donee does not
meet the survivorship condition, that property shall go to the testa-
tor's heirs, rather than to the heirs of the donee. This allows greater
freedom of testation and is certainly consistent with the civil law no-
tion of familial wealth. Further, such provisions will allow a testator
to shorten the great lengths to which courts have occasionally gone
in order to determine the sequence of death." Finally, since there
will be only one transmission of the patrimony, a testator may avoid
double taxation in rapid succession."6
Despite its clarity, however, several questions remain unanswered
by Baten. The first and most obvious is the period of time that a
testator may stipulate for the survival of his legatee. Here, the
thirty-day suspensive condition was deemed brief enough not to con-
stitute a charge to preserve. There is language in the opinion which
seems to indicate that had the condition been longer in duration, the
court might have declared it resolutory and, therefore, a charge to
preserve." If such an approach is taken by the court, then a longer
condition, even though apparently suspensive, could result in finding
a prohibited substitution. As discussed above, such rationale is inap-
propriate."6 A preferable restraint to lengthy suspensive conditions
is found in article 1519. An objectionably long suspensive period
could be invalidated as an illegal, immoral, or impossible condition.
This approach would allow the court to address unequivocally what
75. E.g., In re Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1968) (by
computing the relative speed of the two autos involved in the crash, the coroner deter-
mined that the legatee had survived the testatrix by 1/150,000 of a second); In re Buc-
ci's Will, 57 Misc. 2d 1001, 293 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1968) (after an airplane crash, determina-
tion that the wife's blood contained carbon monoxide generated by a gasoline fire was
sufficient to show that wife had survived husband).
76. The harsh consequences of double taxation under Louisiana's inheritance tax
provisions have been avoided by the judicial fiction of seizin in law, as opposed to
seizin in fact. Under this concept the heir is seized in law immediately upon the death
of the testator. Yet, the heir is not subject to taxation until actually sent into posses-
sion, ie., seized in fact. Succession of Martin, 234 La. 566, 100 So. 2d 509 (1958); Suc-
cession of Bynum, 137 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962). See LA. R.S. 47:2401-2435
(Supp. 1956 & 1979).
Under the provisions of the federal estate tax, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2209 (1976), a
credit is provided for estate tax paid on property transferred by a prior decedent. See
26 U.S.C. § 2013 (1976). While this provision likewise provides some relief from double
taxation, the judicial approval of survivorship clauses affords a testator greater flex-
ibility in tax and estate planning.
In the event that a survivorship clause is included in a will, section 2056 provides
that application of the marital deduction will not be precluded if the survivorship
clause does not exceed six months. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976).
77. 386 So. 2d at 337.
78. See text at note 70, supra.
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is obviously a question of public policy without resorting to abstract
legal methodology. Further, such reasoning is less intrusive on the
testator's wishes-a condition in violation of article 1519 is merely
reputed as not written. 9 Thus, the disposition would still go to the
first donee unburdened by the condition, as opposed to being
stricken in its entirety, as in the case of a prohibited substitution.
The distinction between the two approaches is important insofar as
it affects the will. A prohibited substitution invalidates the entire
disposition. However, an illegal, immoral, or impossible condition
would merely be reputed as not written, and the initial disposition
would stand.
Exactly what period of time might violate public policy,
however, is left to speculation and to future judicial resolution.
Under the court's reasoning, while there is no gap in seizin, the
disposition is not entirely effective until the condition is fulfilled.
While the property is not totally removed from commerce during
this period, its alienability is affected, since any transfer might be
subject to the condition. The amount of time that public policy will
permit succession property to be so encumbered could conceivably
differ according to the type of property bequeathed or the type of
condition imposed. Since survivorship clauses are normally imposed
to provide for a common disaster," the allowable suspensive period
probably will remain fairly brief. But conditional testamentary dona-
tions may be made in other instances. Often a testator will leave
property to a minor conditioned upon his attaining the age of ma-
jority. 1 In Succession of McCan82 such dispositions were held imper-
missible, because they contained all the evils of a prohibited
substitution. In light of Baten, however, this rationale should no
longer apply, and whether the court now will sanction a potentially
long suspensive period remains an open question.
An additional question raised by Baten is whether conditions of
survivorship may be imposed upon a forced heir. Article 1710"3 and
79. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1519. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1517, 1527, 2031. Since a
major justification for prohibiting certain substitutions is to prohibit property from be-
ing removed from commerce, it is easy to see that a lengthy charge to preserve could
be viewed as against public policy. Should the survivorship period be excessively long,
for example 100 years, the condition could be treated as impossible within the meaning
of article 1519. Arguments that a long suspensive condition violates notions of seizin or
constitutes a prohibited substitution, however, are inapposite.
80. See Nathan, supra note 8, at 41.
81. Calvert v. Boullement, 46 La. Ann. 1132, 15 So. 363 (1894); Lenora v. Scott, 10
La. Ann. 651 (1885).
82. 48 La. Ann. 145, 19 So. 220 (1895).
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1710.
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prior jurisprudence" clearly establish that the legitimate portion of
a forced heir cannot be encumbered with conditions. But when the
donor bequeaths more than the legitimate portion, he perhaps could
attach any lawful conditions which would apply to the bequest as a
whole.85 Should the heir dispute the condition, transfer of the forced
portion is unaffected." If the legatee takes without disputing the
condition, it is assumed that he takes all of the legacy subject to the
condition. Should he then fail to meet the requirements of that con-
dition, transfer of the disposable portion would be precluded,"
although the legatee is still entitled to receive the forced portion.
The minimal impact of Baten is to sanction brief suspensively
conditional legacies. More broadly, the decision demonstrates a fairly
liberal attitude, favoring freedom of testation, which may be
manifested in subsequent cases in this area. The tendency seems to
be to afford such dispositions a presumption of validity which will
stand unless denied by a specific prohibition, and applicable prohibi-
tions will be narrowly construed. To uphold the will in Baten, the
court had to dispel some entrenched misconceptions concerning
several ancient doctrines. That it was able to do so while clarifying
the underlying principles of those doctrines is commendable.
Daryl H. Owen
Davis v. Passman: A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The plaintiff brought suit seeking damages' alleging that Con-
gressman Otto Passman had discriminated against her on the basis
of sex by firing plaintiff from her position as his deputy ad-
ministrative assistant.! The United States Supreme Court, reversing
84. See, e.g., Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880); Chase v. Matthew's
Executors, 12 La. 357 (1838).
85. Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218, 1220 (1880).
86. Id.
87. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1698 (legacy is invalid if the legatee dies before the con-
dition can be fulfilled).
1. The petitioner also sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement, but
Congressman Passman's election defeat rendered this claim moot.
2. The federal district court sustained the respondent's Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
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